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In Re: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS’ 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Football is a beloved American pastime; however, experts have 
found that professional football players are at a significantly 
increased risk for serious brain injury.  This lawsuit is the latest 
in a series of actions related to a settlement agreement (the 
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“Settlement Agreement”), which seeks to address the claims of 
former players who believe they suffered brain damage while 
playing football.  Specifically, the Settlement Agreement is 
between the National Football League (“NFL”) and a 
subsidiary on one hand and specified, eligible retired NFL 
players, respective claimants, and derivative claimants on the 
other.  The purpose of the Settlement Agreement is to provide 
monetary awards to former players who receive a qualifying 
diagnosis after following the necessary protocol outlined in the 
Settlement Agreement.  
Relevant to this appeal, the Settlement Agreement’s claims 
administrator (the “Claims Administrator”) and the District 
Court, respectively, created and adopted a set of clarifying, 
revised rules relating to the “successful operation” of a specific 
aspect of the monetary award program created by the 
Settlement Agreement.  A2.  Appellants Melvin Aldridge and 
59 other retired NFL players or their estates (“Appellants”) 
appeal the District Court’s orders dated April 11, 2019, and 
May 16, 2019 (collectively, the “Orders”), which adopted and 
implemented the revised rules devised by the Claims 
Administrator.   
Appellants are concerned with four of those revised rules, 
arguing that (1) the revised rules amended the Settlement 
Agreement, and (2) alternatively, if the revised rules did not 
amend the Settlement Agreement, the District Court abused its 
discretion by adopting the four revised rules.1  Defendants-
 
1 Specifically, Appellants are concerned with revised rules 9, 
10(b), 13(k), and 23.  See infra footnote 9 (discussing the rules 
in more detail).  These four rules were all either additions to or 
revisions of previously promulgated and adopted rules 
clarifying an aspect of the Settlement Agreement.  See Quick 
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Appellees National Football League and NFL Properties LLC, 
successor-in-interest to NFL Properties, Inc. (collectively 
“NFL-Appellees” or “Defendants”), and Appellee 
BrownGreer PLC, the District Court-appointed Claims 
Administrator, believe the District Court’s Orders were 
correct.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the 










Reference Guide: Qualified MAF Physician Rules, In re: 
National Football League Players’ Concussion Injury 
Litigation No. 2:12-md-02323 (E.D. Pa.), 
https://www.nflconcussionsettlement.com/Docs/Rules_Qualif
ied_MAF_Physicians.pdf  (last visited June 12, 2020) 
(explaining that Revised Rules 9 and 23 are additions, that 
Revised Rule 10(b) was a partial addition, and that Revised 
Rule 13(k) was a revision).  Herein, they will all be referred to 




I.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. The Settlement Agreement and the Rules Governing 
Qualified Monetary Award Fund Physicians2 
The Settlement Agreement at the heart of this case resolved a 
class action lawsuit brought by former NFL players.  See In re 
Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 821 
F.3d 410, 420–25 (3d Cir. 2016), as amended (May 2, 2016) 
(explaining the origin of the concussion lawsuits, providing 
background on the Settlement Agreement, and affirming the 
District Court’s class certification and approval of the 
Settlement Agreement); see also In re Nat’l Football League 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 923 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 
2019) (“Under the settlement agreement, approximately 
200,000 class members gave up their claims in exchange for 
potential proceeds from an uncapped settlement fund.”).  The 
 
2 For reference, and discussed below, a qualified monetary 
award fund physician (“Qualified MAF Physician”) is, as 
defined by the Settlement Agreement, “a board-certified 
neurologist, board-certified neurosurgeon, or other board-
certified neuro-specialist physician, who is part of an approved 
list of physicians authorized to make” specific diagnoses on 
eligible retired NFL players seeking a monetary award under 
the Settlement Agreement.  A729.  Per the Settlement 
Agreement, an eligible, retired NFL player who seeks a 
monetary award, for injuries sustained while playing football 
for the NFL, must have a qualifying diagnosis from a pre-
approved physician.  “The Qualified MAF Physicians across 
the country . . . perform a crucial role in carrying out the 
Settlement Program in examining Retired NFL Football 
Players to determine if they have” any of the qualifying 
diagnoses.  A1157.   
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crux of the matter before us centers on whether the District 
Court erroneously interpreted the Settlement Agreement by 
finding that the Revised Rules were not amendments, or, if the 
interpretation was sound and there were no amendments, 
whether the District Court abused its discretion in adopting and 
approving the Revised Rules governing qualified monetary 
award fund physicians (“Qualified MAF Physicians”) 
promulgated by the Claims Administrator.  As we work 
through this issue, three matters provide the critical backdrop 
for our analysis: (1) the District Court’s continuing jurisdiction 
and role regarding the Settlement Agreement, (2) the 
Settlement Agreement’s program for submitting claims and 
obtaining a monetary award, and (3) the Claims 
Administrator’s role and duties.    
First, Article XXVII of the Settlement Agreement focuses on 
jurisdiction, and is aptly titled “Continuing Jurisdiction.”  
A807.  It details the District Court’s “continuing and exclusive 
jurisdiction over” the Settlement Agreement’s “interpretation, 
implementation, administration, and enforcement.”  Id.  
Specifically, it explains that the parties to the Settlement 
Agreement, including “each Settlement Class Member, are 
hereby deemed to have submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of [the District] Court for any suit, action, proceeding or 
dispute arising out of, or relating to, this Settlement 
Agreement.”  Id. 
Second, as we have already explained, the Settlement 
Agreement establishes that former players must have a 
qualifying diagnosis to be eligible for a monetary award 
pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.  See In re Nat’l Football 
League, 923 F.3d at 101 (“In order to receive an award [per the 
Settlement Agreement], a class member must first submit a 
claim package including medical records reflecting a 
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qualifying diagnosis, among other things.”).3  Other than for 
death with CTE, a player may obtain a qualifying diagnosis 
necessary for a successful claim package from a Qualified 
MAF Physician.4  A Qualified MAF Physician can provide a 
diagnosis on a Level 1.5 neurocognitive impairment, a Level 2 
neurocognitive impairment, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s 
disease, and ALS.  Further, a Qualified MAF Physician’s 
diagnosis of Level 1.5 and Level 2 neurocognitive impairment 
is to be “generally consistent” with the Baseline Assessment 
 
3 There are six potential qualifying diagnoses: (1) Level 1.5 
neurocognitive impairment, (2) Level 2 neurocognitive 
impairment, (3) Alzheimer’s disease, (4) Parkinson’s disease, 
(5) death with chronic traumatic encephalopathy (“CTE”), and 
(6) Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (“ALS”).   
4 The Qualified MAF Physicians are chosen by the Claims 
Administrator and must be approved by class counsel and 
counsel for the NFL.  Of note, “91% of the [eligible retired 
NFL players] . . . live within 150 miles of one or more 
Qualified MAF Physicians.”  A1158.  Further, and 
alternatively, though not specifically relevant here, an eligible, 
retired player could, in some instances, seek to obtain a 
qualifying diagnosis of either a Level 1.5 neurocognitive 
impairment or a Level 2 neurocognitive impairment from a 
Baseline Assessment Program (“BAP”) provider.  See In re 
Nat’l Football League, 923 F.3d at 101 (explaining that players 
“without a diagnosis prior to January 7, 2017, were required to 
receive a diagnosis from a practitioner approved through the 
settlement Baseline Assessment Program (BAP).”).  Qualified 
BAP Provider-diagnoses were to be made in accordance with 




Program (“BAP”) diagnostic criteria as set forth in the 
Settlement Agreement.5  If a player receives a qualifying 
diagnosis and submits a claim package, the claim package is 
then reviewed by the Claims Administrator who determines the 
player’s monetary award.  See id. (explaining that the Claims 
Administrator reviews a claim package “for deficiencies, 
investigates . . . claim[s] as appropriate, and . . .  [determines] 
whether the class member qualifies for a monetary award. 
Either the class member or the NFL can then appeal the 
monetary award determination. Only after any appeals are 
completed does the Claims Administrator pay out the 
individual’s award.”).   
Third, in addition to defining the Claims Administrator, the 
Settlement Agreement sets forth numerous duties for the 
Claims Administrator to perform.6  For example, as mentioned, 
the Claims Administrator processes and reviews claim 
packages.  The Claims Administrator also must “take all steps 
necessary to faithfully implement and administer the 
 
5 The BAP diagnostic criteria for Level 1.5 and Level 2 
neurocognitive impairment are generalized guidelines 
regarding what a diagnosis must include and consider, such as: 
“The cognitive deficits do not occur exclusively in the context 
of a delirium, acute substance abuse, or as a result of 
medication side effects.”  A819.  
 
6 The Claims Administrator is defined as: “that person(s) or 
entity, agreed to and jointly recommended by Co-Lead Class 
Counsel and Counsel for the NFL Parties, and appointed by the 
Court, to perform the responsibilities assigned to the Claims 
Administrator under this Settlement Agreement, including, 
without limitation, as set forth in Section 10.2.”  A722.  As 
noted, BrownGreer PLC is the Claims Administrator. 
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Settlement Agreement,” A768, and must “establish and 
implement procedures to detect and prevent fraudulent 
submissions to, and payments of fraudulent claims from, the 
Monetary Award Fund,” A770.  Indeed, the Claims 
Administrator “will also establish system-wide processes to 
detect and prevent fraud, including, without limitation, claims 
processing quality training and review and data analytics to 
spot ‘red flags’ of fraud, including . . . the number of claims 
from similar addresses or supported by the same physician or 
office of physicians[.]”  A774  
Given these duties, the Claims Administrator is obligated, 
should there be a need, to promulgate rules at various times 
regarding the proper administration of the Settlement 
Agreement.  See, e.g., A1158–59 (explaining the 
promulgation, in 2018, of 16 rules governing Qualified MAF 
Physicians, “covering various aspects of physician enrollment 
and training, submission of appointment and diagnosis 
information, ethical requirements and suspension and 
termination” (herein called, the “Rules Governing Qualified 
MAF Physicians”)); see also Governing Rules, NFL 
Concussion Settlement, 
https://www.nflconcussionsettlement.com/Governing_Rules.a
spx (last visited June 12, 2020) (outlining sets of rules 
governing the Settlement Program generally).7 
 
 
7 Appellants did not appeal the Rules Governing Qualified 
MAF Physicians when they were originally promulgated and 
adopted, respectively, by the Claims Administrator and the 




B. The District Court and the Revised Rules Governing 
Qualified MAF Physicians  
Following a directive from the District Court, the Claims 
Administrator developed, for review and approval, 
clarifications and revisions regarding the already existing 
Rules Governing Qualified MAF Physicians.8  Thus—to 
“[i]mplement[] the [District] Court’s . . . [directive] and [in an] 
effort[] to promote the successful operation of the network of 
Qualified MAF Physicians”—the Revised Rules Governing 
Qualified MAF Physicians (a/k/a the “Revised Rules”) were 
developed.  A1159.  
Where the original Rules Governing Qualified MAF 
Physicians sought to provide “greater clarity . . . to all 
participants,” A1157, the goal of the Revised Rules was “to 
help [the] Program deliver benefits quickly and correctly to 
Settlement Class Members who deserve them,” A1159.  
Specifically, the Revised Rules sought to: (1) provide clear 
guidance to Qualified MAF Physicians, (2) reduce processing 
delays, (3) help the program run efficiently, (4) further the 
fairness of the program, and (5) get the medicine right.  See 
A1159–60.  The District Court approved and adopted the 
 
8 The District Court explained that after reviewing exhibits 
submitted by parties in a separate but still related to the 
Settlement Agreement-appeal, “a number of reports and 
certifications submitted by Qualified MAF Physicians . . . 
failed to set forth the doctor’s analysis as to why the diagnosis 
of Level 1.5 Neurocognitive Impairment . . . or Level 2 
Neurocognitive Impairment . . . was ‘generally consistent’ with 




Revised Rules on April 11, 2019 (i.e., the “April 11 Order”).  
See A2.   
The Revised Rules added an additional nine rules/revisions to 
the previously created and approved Rules Governing 
Qualified MAF Physicians—the original rules are not the 
subject of this appeal and were not contested by the Appellants 
in this case.   
Relevant to this appeal are four of the nine rules: Revised Rule 
9, Revised Rule 10(b), Revised Rule 13(k), and Revised Rule 
23.9  Additionally, while former-Co-Lead Class Counsel and 
 
9 Generally, with exceptions provided, Rule 9 is the “150-Mile 
Rule for MAF Examinations,” requiring a player to see a 
Qualified MAF Physician located within 150 miles of the 
player’s primary residence.  A8.  Rule 10(b), again with 
exceptions provided, concerns the “50-Mile Rule for 
Examining Neuropsychologists” that requires a 
neuropsychologist assisting a Qualified MAF Physician to be 
located within 50 miles of the Qualified MAF Physician’s 
office.  A9.  Rule 13(k), a sub-rule under “Avoidance of 
Questionable Practices,” prevents a Qualified MAF Physician 
from examining or diagnosing a player who is “represented by 
a lawyer or law firm for whom or for which the Qualified MAF 
Physician provides services as a consulting or testifying expert 
witness.”  A10–11.  And Rule 23 falls under the general 
category pertaining to “Assistance by the Claims 
Administrator” and relates to the “[Appeals Advisory Panel 
(“AAP”)] Leadership Council.”  A13–14; see also A721 
(defining, in § 2.1(g) of the Settlement Agreement, the AAP).  
Rule 23 articulates the type of work the AAP Members can 
assist with and who may appoint the AAP Members.  See A14 
(“Two AAP Members serve as the Claims Administrator’s 
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Class Counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 
11 Order adopting the Revised Rules, they did not file appeals 
after the District Court denied their Motion for 
Reconsideration on May 16, 2019 (i.e., the “May 16 Order”).  
Thus, Appellants in this case—members of the class—are 
appealing the District Court’s Orders.10  Appellants’ Notices of 
Appeal were timely.   
II.   JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, see In re Nat’l Football League, 775 
F.3d 570, 574 (3d Cir. 2014), and it retained jurisdiction over 
the administration of the Settlement Agreement,  see, e.g., In 
re Nat’l Football League., 923 F.3d at 109 (“Pursuant to the 
settlement agreement and the District Court order approving 
and adopting the agreement, the District Court retained the 
authority to enforce the terms of, and administer, the 
 
AAP Leadership Counsel to provide the Claims Administrator 
advice and assistance on any medical issues arising in the 
monitoring of the work of Qualified MAF Physicians.  This 
includes review of specific claims or groups of claims . . . to 
determine compliance by Qualified MAF Physicians with the 
Settlement Agreement[.]”).     
 
10 As a point of interest, now sole-Class Counsel Christopher 
A. Seeger submitted a 28(i) letter in this case.  See generally 
Class Counsel 28(i) letter dated Sept. 23, 2019.  The 28(i) letter 
concluded with Mr. Seeger adopting “the arguments and 
authorities contained in the respective briefs of the Appellees 
NFL Parties and Claims Administrator[.]”  Id. at 3.  
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settlement.”).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.   
We review a district court’s interpretation of a contract for 
clear error.  In re Nat’l Football League, 923 F.3d at 107 n.8.  
Clear error is a deferential standard of review.  Karlo v. 
Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 86 (3d Cir. 2017).  
We review a district court’s exercise of its “authority to 
administer and implement a class action settlement for abuse 
of discretion.”  In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 543 F.3d 
179, 184 n.10 (3d Cir. 2008).  “[T]o find an abuse of discretion 
the District Court’s decision must rest on ‘a clearly erroneous 
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper 
application of law to fact.’”  Id. (quoting In re Nutraquest, Inc., 
434 F.3d 639, 645 (3d Cir.2006)).  
III.   ANALYSIS 
We will affirm the District Court’s Orders.  First, the District 
Court correctly determined—after interpreting the contract—
that Revised Rules 9, 10(b), 13(k), and 23 are permissible 
clarifications created for the Settlement Agreement’s proper 
and successful administration—for example, to prevent 
fraud—and were not amendments.  See A1-2, 19-23 (the 
Orders); see also A807 (detailing in Article XXVII of the 
Settlement Agreement the District Court’s “continuing and 
exclusive jurisdiction over” the Settlement Agreement’s 
“interpretation, implementation, administration, and 
enforcement” (emphasis added));  see also In re Nat’l Football 
League, 923 F.3d at 107 n.8 (restating that contract 
interpretation is reviewed for clear error).  Second, the District 
Court’s adoption of the Revised Rules and continued 
administration of the Settlement Agreement was reasonable 
and does not constitute an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 108 
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(noting the District Court’s “broad jurisdiction to administer 
the settlement and resolve issues relating to it”); see also In re 
Diet Drugs, 543 F.3d at 184 n.10. 
A. The District Court’s Interpretation of the Settlement 
Agreement Was Not Clearly Erroneous  
 
The District Court’s interpretation of the Settlement 
Agreement, and its determination that Revised Rules 9, 10(b), 
13(k), and 23 did not constitute amendments, was not clearly 
erroneous.  See In re Nat’l Football League, 923 F.3d at 107 
n.8; see also A809 (requiring Class Counsel’s written consent 
for any “change, modification, amendment, or addition” to the 
Settlement Agreement).  District courts may interpret contracts 
to determine whether alterations to bargained-for terms have 
occurred.  See, e.g., Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 233 F.3d 188, 
189, 193 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court’s 
interpretation of a settlement agreement in a securities class 
action suit, and finding the district court’s interpretation of the 
agreement was not clearly erroneous and that the deadline for 
submitting claims was not part of the parties’ bargained-for-
agreement and thus could be changed); see also Sullivan v. DB 
Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 312 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that a 
district court cannot “modify the terms of 
a voluntary settlement agreement between parties” (citation 
and emphasis omitted)); Collins v. Educ. Therapy Ctr., 184 
F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting “the notion . . . that the 
court effectively amended the settlement . . . [because the] 
order does not alter the terms of the settlement.”). 
Here, the District Court correctly interpreted the Settlement 
Agreement and found that what was promised to eligible 
players, in part, was the ability to see a Qualified MAF 
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Physician.  See, e.g., A21 (finding for example that “Retired 
Players have [no] absolute right to choose a MAF Physician,” 
only the right to go to one and receive a diagnosis (emphasis 
added)).  Revised Rules 9, 10(b), 13(k), and 23 do not negate 
that promise.  Rather, they provide clarifications as to how 
Qualified MAF Physicians may be seen, how diagnoses are to 
be made ethically, and how diagnoses are to be reviewed 
efficiently.   
Indeed, as explained by the District Court, Revised Rules 9, 
10(b), 13(k), and 23 were permissible clarifications that 
“facilitate the efficient and successful operation of the network 
of Qualified MAF Physicians.”  A2.  The “Revised Rules 
advance the fundamental goal of the Settlement: to process all 
meritorious claims as efficiently as possible, while ensuring 
non-meritorious claims are not paid.”  A20.  Thus, as the 
Revised Rules do not change any fundamental purpose of the 
Agreement, and only help to facilitate its successful 
administration, there was no clear error in the District Court’s 
interpretation and conclusion.  See In re Cendant Corp. Prides 
Litig., 233 F.3d at 193 (applying the clearly erroneous standard 
to contract interpretation, which is a question of fact).   
Specifically, Revised Rules 9 and 10(b) denote geographical 
restrictions that eligible retired NFL players must abide by 
when obtaining a diagnosis (i.e., how far a player may travel to 
see a doctor, provided there are certain exceptions).  The 
geographical restrictions found in Revised Rules 9 and 10(b) 
are consistent with the Settlement Agreement’s general and 
broad mandate that a qualifying diagnosis must be made by a 
Qualified MAF Physician.  
As the District Court correctly noted, there is no language in 
the Settlement Agreement that gives a retired NFL player a 
18 
 
“unilateral right to choose a MAF Physician.”  A21.  “[W]hile 
Retired Players have the choice of seeking certain Qualifying 
Diagnoses from . . . MAF Physicians, Retired Players do not 
have an unfettered right to choose their . . . MAF Physician.”  
A21 (emphasis added).  Further, Revised Rules 9 and 10(b) 
were designed not to curtail a player’s ability to see a Qualified 
MAF Physician but to prevent potentially fraudulent diagnoses 
by stopping “forum shopping” for favorable, and potentially 
unethical, MAF physicians.  A22.   As such, these two rules 
directly relate to the concern that certain class members were 
traveling far distances to see specific doctors that might 
provide favorable diagnoses.  These two rules are not 
prohibited by any term of the Settlement Agreement, and the 
District Court’s interpretation—that these rules do not amend 
or alter the Agreement—was not clearly erroneous.   
Revised Rule 13(k) likewise seeks to eliminate or reduce 
potential conflicts of interest by preventing a retired NFL 
player from seeing a physician who works with the player’s 
law firm as a consultant or testifying expert witness.  Revised 
Rule 13(k) likewise, as the District Court found, is not an 
amendment to the Settlement Agreement that alters its effect, 
but “is a commonsense rule designed to remove a possible 
conflict of interest from the claims process.”  A23. Nowhere 
does the Settlement Agreement state that eligible players must 
be permitted to see doctors with potential conflicts of interest.  
Revised Rule 13(k) thus helps the Settlement Program remain 
ethically sound and is not an alteration to the terms of 
Settlement Agreement.  Collins, 184 F.3d at 621.  
Finally, Revised Rule 23 “merely formalizes part of the role of 
the AAP,” A23, and assists the Claims Administrator to carry 
out its duties to detect and prevent fraud.  See, e.g., A759 (“The 
Claims Administrator will have the discretion to undertake or 
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cause to be undertaken further verification and investigation . . 
. of any Claim Package . . . .”).   Subsection 2.1(g) of the 
Settlement Agreement explains that AAP members may 
“advise the Court or the Special Master with respect to medical 
aspects of the Class Action Settlement,” A721, and Revised 
Rule 23 provides details on how that can occur, such as, two 
AAP members will “serve as the Claims Administrator’s AAP 
Leadership Counsel to provide . . . advice and assistance on 
any medical issues arising in the monitoring of the work of 
Qualified MAF Physicians” and may  “review . . . specific 
claims . . . to determine compliance by Qualified MAF 
Physicians.”  A14.  Therefore, Revised Rule 23, as the District 
Court also correctly found, “is not a change to the Settlement 
Agreement, but only formalizes one of the Settlement’s 
provisions” (i.e., the specific way that AAP members can help 
the Claims Administrator fulfil its role and successfully 
determine that players and doctors are complying with the 
Settlement Agreement’s provisions).  A23.  
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 
When Adopting the Revised Rules11  
We have already recognized the District Court’s broad 
jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement’s administration.  
In re Nat’l Football League, 923 F.3d at 102 (citing to § 27.1 
of the Settlement Agreement that details the District Court’s 
“continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over . . . [a]ny disputes 
or controversies arising out of, or related to, the interpretation, 
implementation, administration, and enforcement of th[e] 
Settlement Agreement”).  Similarly, per the Settlement 
 
11 We note that Appellants apparently argue that only the 
adoption of Rules 9 and 10(b) constituted an abuse of 
discretion, and thus speak to those two rules herein.   
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Agreement, the Claims Administrator must “take all steps 
necessary to faithfully implement and administer the 
Settlement Agreement[.]”  A768; see also A770 (detailing the 
“Roles and Responsibilities” of the Claims Administrator).  It 
is thus abundantly clear that under the Settlement Agreement, 
the District Court and the Claims Administrator had the 
authority to request clarifying revised rules—which do not 
alter the Agreement—that would permit the efficient 
administration of the Settlement Agreement, including but not 
limited to the prevention of fraudulent activities.  See, e.g., 
A770 (directing the Claims Administrator to “establish and 
implement procedures to detect and prevent fraudulent 
submissions to, and payments of fraudulent claims from, the 
Monetary Award Fund”).  The District Court’s directive to the 
Claims Administrator and adoption of the Revised Rule was 
thus not unreasonable and does not constitute an abuse of 
discretion.  See In re Diet Drugs, 543 F.3d at 184 n.10.  
The Revised Rules were, as the District Court explained, 
adopted to “facilitate the efficient and successful operation of 
the network of Qualified MAF Physicians.”  A2.  Indeed, the 
rationale for the initial Rules Governing Qualified MAF 
Physicians, communicated by the neutral Claims 
Administrator, was “[t]o promote certainty and uniformity in 
[the Physicians’] performance.”  A1158.  Thus, the Revised 
Rules were designed “to help th[e] [Settlement] Program 
deliver benefits quickly and correctly to Settlement Class 
Members who deserve them.”  A1159.   This aligns with the 
District Court’s January 9, 2019 mandate that the Claims 
Administrator should develop clarifications regarding the then 
existing Rules Governing Qualified MAF Physicians, as well 
as with the provisions of the Settlement Agreement itself that 
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direct the Claims Administrator to ferret out fraud and promote 
the efficient administration of the Agreement.  
As such, it is clear that the Revised Rules were created, in part, 
due to the Claims Administrator’s concerns, after having 
reviewed many claim submissions, that there were certain 
“clients of a law firm traveling thousands of miles to see the 
same physician rather than those available to them in their 
hometowns and excessively high numbers and rates of payable 
diagnoses from those doctors[.]”  A1160–61.  Therefore, 
because the Revised Rules were not amendments to the 
Settlement Agreement, and because the Revised Rules aided 
the proper administration of the Settlement Agreement, the 
District Court acted reasonably in adopting the Revised Rules.  
In re Diet Drugs, 543 F.3d at 184 n.10. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District 
Court’s April 11 and May 16 Orders.   
